9 August 2004 Lecture Summary

Philosophers Examined: David Hume, Thomas Reid.

Line of Thought: Today we discussed Section XII of Hume's Enquiry. In this section Hume divides skepticism into several different categories:

I. Antecedent: this is the sort we find in Descartes's methodic doubt. Hume holds that this is not a genuinely practicable form of skepticism.

II. Consequent: this skepticism arises after we have begun to engage in inquiry and investigation. Hume notes several points on which skeptical topics arise:

   A. evidence of the senses (opinion of external existence)

   B. abstract reasoning (mathematics)

   C. moral reasoning

We spent the most time discussing (A), which is heavily influenced by Berkeley (see, for instance, Principles 54-57). Hume distinguishes the topics of (C) into popular and philosophical, which turns out to be an immensely important distinction. Popular skeptical topics are weak, since they depend on the evidence of practical life in a way that limits their extent. The skeptic is on stronger ground in the philosophical skeptical topics. These, however, also reach a limit. Excessive or 'Pyrrhonian' skepticism is ultimately always subverted by the pressing needs and passions of common, everyday life.

Hume's own preferred skepticism is what he calls a mitigated or 'Academic' skepticism. It inculcates humility and limits our inquiries to those fields that are "best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding." This, you will note, ties in closely with the express intent of the Enquiry, as stated in Section I.

We finished by briefly discussing Thomas Reid and his 'common sense' approach to the issue of skepticism, in particular dwelling on his rejection of "the way of ideas".

To Read for Wednesday: Read the selections from the Critique of Pure Reason in the Baird & Kaufmann book.