Wednesday, July 14, 2004

14 July 2004 Lecture Summary

 
Philosophers Examined: Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Butler
 
Activity: I divided several selections from Jonathan Edwards's works among groups. The groups read the passages aloud, then discussed and summarized them, presenting their summaries to the class. The selections were from "The Mind," The Freedom of the Will, and The True Nature of Virtue. The topics covered Edwards's immaterialism, determinism, and theory that true virtue is benevolence toward being in general.
 
I then began to lecture on Butler.
 
Line of Thought: We started with Butler's approach, what he calls "probability." This must be distinguished from other things we might call "probability." In essence, it is a form of presumptive reasoning. It is radically pragmatic in nature. The idea is this. For practical life, we can't wait for a strict demonstration of absolutely everything. So what we actually do, and what it is reasonable to do, for matters of great practical importance, is to take the evidence we have, however limited, and draw from it a conclusion, even if the inference is only a weak analogy,  and presume that conclusion to be true until we have good positive reason to think our conclusion needs to be changed. Butler applies this type of reasoning to religious and ethical matters, and does so with considerable acuity. We spent some time discussing Butler's strategic use of this type of reasoning - just as Berkeley does not merely present arguments, but coordinated arguments, whose coordination has to be recognized for accurate response, Butler presents not merely presumptive arguments but coordinated presumptive arguments, in which each element of his position tends to be undergirded by several independent evidences, each of which, in a pinch, would allow for the presumption in question.
 
I then looked in some detail at what Butler says, in the Analogy of Religion, on the future life, to clarify what he is doing.
 
The class ended with a brief look at Butler's views on moral providence, i.e., the moral system of nature. We only got so far, however, as discussing in general his views on the method of providence, with focus on what he calls natural providence, i.e, the natural system of rewards and punishments by which individuals and species are kept in being. Butler will use this as a basis for an analogical argument for moral providence, which we will examine more closely next class.